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RICHARD DEVLIN* 
Solidarity or Solipsistic Tunnel Vision? Reminiscences 
of a Renegade Rapporteur** 
l. INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS1 
Given the approximately ninety seven presentations by activists, government 
officials, NGO representatives, politicians, sociologists, philosophers, lawyers 
and many others, what I want to do is briefly highlight some of what are, in my 
opinion, the key themes and tensions of the Conference and to play them out. 
However, my approach is not simply descriptive or synthetic, but critical and 
visionary. It also oscillates between pessimism and optimism. Thus my 
contribution follows the exhortation by feminist poet and writer, Adrienne 
Rich, when she calls for: 
"imagination, not merely for changing institutions but for human 
relationships; not merely for equal rights, but for a new kind of being". 2 
I should also add that given the status of those who have already presented and 
the quality of some of the papers I am quite nervous in giving these closing 
comments. But here goes. 
2. THE NEED FOR. CONCEPTUAL CLARITY: THE NATURE OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
To some extent, I was disappointed that few of the presenters directly or 
expressly addressed the question of the nature of human rights. This may be 
• Associate Professor of Law, The University of Calgary, Calgary, Alberta. 
•• This was the Rapporteur's speech at the closing of the Conference. 
'This report is, to a significant degree, the end product of a collective effort. Given that for a 
large part of the Conference several presentations were happening simultaneously, it was necessary 
that I gained the assistance of David Dzidzornu (LLM candidate, University of Calgary) and 
Rebecca Johnson (Third Year LLB student, The University of Calgary). Their support was 
invaluable, although what follows does not necessarily represent their opinions. 
1 A. Rich, "Toward a Woman Centre University" in lies, Secrets and Silence (1979) pp. 125 at 
155. 
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because most people assume that they (and everyone else) knows what they 
mean by human rights. However, I believe that this is a false assumption, that 
many of us have differing conceptions of human rights and that in the 
presentations given there appear to have been several not necessarily 
compatible assumptions. In short, human rights is "an essentially contested 
concept". 3 I think it is important to be clear right from the beginning as to what 
we mean by human rights, because that assumption will determine the 
remainder of our analysis. Two conceptions, in particular, tended to surface in 
the Conference and it is important to spotlight them because they underpin, 
concretize and reflect many of the other tensions of the last couple of days. 
These I shall call "the essentialist" and "the critical modernist" versions of 
human rights. 
(1) The Essentialist Version 
The idea underpinning the essentialist conception of human rights is that there 
is something about us as human beings, something that goes to our very nature, 
that inherently suggests that we have an entitlement to basic rights. The core 
theme is that human rights transcend the contingencies of politics. 
At first blush, this version of human rights is attractive. The very 
universalizability and generalizability of this viewpoint makes it desirable. But 
it is. unfortunately, pervaded by a variety of problems. First, its very 
abstraction and lack of specificity while being its greatest strength in one sense, 
is also its central weakness. It is simply too vague and there is a fundamental 
lack of consensus as to what the nature and parameters of these basic rights 
might be� This becomes particularly apparent when the human rights dialogue 
is cracked open to the perspective of those who have traditionally been excluded 
from the conversation. This leads to the second problem. As several of the 
presenters at the conference have indicated, the universality ascribed to human 
rights discourse is false in that it incorporates Eurocentric and male 
assumptions. Restated, the white male perspective is the hidden but 
determinative norm of the dominant tradition in human rights. Third, the 
essentialist version is based upon a pre-modern concept of the person. In the 
spirit of the ancient Greek philosophers, it assumes that there is a core/ essential 
subject, whereas a modern viewpoint comprehends the subject as a construct of 
a multitude of influences. 
(2) The Critical Modernist Perspective 
The critical modernist perspective refuses to essentialize human rights in this 
way. It conceives of human rights as an ideological discursive practice, that is, 
as a way of thinking, talking and knowing that facilitates, structures and 
' W.B. Gallie, "Essentially Contested Concepts" (1955) Ivi Aristotelian Society Proceedings 
N.S. pp. 167-198. 
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underpins the ways and means of social interaction. The key idea is that human 
rights are not distinct from politics, but an element of politics. Therefore, 
human rights are a contestable terrain of political struggle. By filtering 
discourse of human rights through the prism of politics, we then get particular, 
contextual and concrete angles on human rights debates. Because politics is 
about domination and subordination, power and powerlessness, the question 
can now be reformulated: "Can human rights as a discursive practice be utilized 
to break the hierarchy of domination and subordination?" 
The significance of the "critical modernist view" is threefold. First, human 
rights cannot be ossified, reduced or restricted to any pseudo-determinative 
idea, like for example, "Liberty". To do so is ahistorical and unnecessarily 
enthrals us to liberal origins of the discourse of rights. Rather, I want to argue 
that human rights discourse should be conceived of as open-ended and 
revisable. Second, and more specifically, the critical modernist approach posits 
that human rights be developed to respond to and facilitate the achievement of 
the needs of people. Thus it does not mire itself in abstracti_ons, but focuses on 
subordination and powerlessness in their diverse, specific and particularized 
forms. Third, this refurbished human rights discourse then provides us with an 
opportunity to not only challenge power, that is, domination and 
subordination which is "power over" or what Ursula Franklin called 
"control", but perhaps it also allows us the possibility to reconceptualize power 
as "power to", as "empowerment". Therefore, human rights can be developed 
as a strategy of resistance to help us articulate, and to give effect to another 
form of power, "power to". 
2. KEY CONCEPTS OF CONFERENCE 
I was also a little disappointed at the looseness of the terminology used by a 
significant number of the participants and, more particularly, by the failure of 
some of the papers to address themes specified by the coordinators. In order to 
fill in this lacuna, let me briefly, though perhaps belatedly, attempt to trace for 
you my conception of the key concepts of "solidarity" and "interdependence", 
and the correlative and implicit ideal of "equality". 
(I) Solidarity 
In my opinion, the concept of solidarity was bandied about with a disturbing 
amount of imprecision. Let me offer two angles on it. The first draws on the 
work of the Latin American jurisprude and social theorist, Roberto 
Mangabeira Unger. The second comes from the work of some North American 
feminists, in particular, Carol Gilligan and Joan Tronto. 
Unger, in his more visionary moments, offers us a substantive, normative 
vision for social interaction. He posits that 
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"[solidarity is] love struggling to move beyond the circle of intimacy ... The 
kernel of solidarity is our feeling of responsibility for those whose lives touch 
in some way upon our own and our greater or lesser willingness to share their 
fate. Solidarity is the social face of love ... "4 
Carol Gilligan and Joan Trento have, along with many other North American 
feminists, suggested that we need a new social morality, what they call an ethic 
of care. 5 The central insight of the ethic of care is a consciousness of the 
constitutive interconnection of self and other. It encourages an enthusiasm for 
and understanding of the needs of others. It engenders a willingness to respond 
compassionately and responsibly to those needs. The ethic of care is, I suggest, 
a cognate of solidarity. 
(2) Interdependence 
Interdependence was more directly invoked by the presenters but it too has had 
a chameleon character, so let me attempt to introduce, once again, a little 
precision. Several layers of meaning were invoked for the purposes of this 
conference, but I want to suggest that the pref erred emphasis should be on the 
third. The first level of meaning is descriptive, that is, the commonplace - now 
trite - idea that we live in a global village. One direct consequence of this is that 
we co-exist in economic mutual reliance. The second level of meaning might be 
described as "existential", that is, that as people we need each other for our 
mutual survival beyond material provisioning. 
The third layer of interdependence I would describe as "ethical". As persons 
and communities, our identities are based upon the paradox of a need for, and 
yet a distance from "others" .6 Solidarity, as an ethos, proposes that we should 
reject · "the fear of the Other"; a fear which I believe lies at the heart of 
subordination of the other one, for example, the basis of race, gender, class or 
sexual orientation. 1 Interdependence encourages the recognition that we need 
the other to be ourselves. This would suggest that we need to embrace and foster 
a radical diversity and to reject the repressive impulses of the ideology of 
sameness. For example, I would suggest that those who claim to be human 
rights supporters and proponents of interdependence and solidarity should 
concur with Ovide Mercredi's proposition that Canada must recognize and 
proactively support the "self-determination of First Nations" in Canada. 
Those of us who have power have nothing to fear from the other except, 
• R. Unger, law in Modern Society (1975) 207,208. 
• C. Gilligan, In a Different Voice (1982); J. Tronto, "Beyond Gender Difference Towards a 
Theory of Care" (1987) 12 Signs 644-663. For a significantly more nuanced discussion of the ethic 
of care than can be offered here see my "Nomos and Thanatos Part B: Feminism as Jurisgenerative 
Transformation, or Resistance Through Partial Incorporation" (1990) 13 Dal.L.J. pp. 123-210. 
• See generally, Roberto Mangabeira Unger, Passion: An Essay on Human Personality (1984) 
' See my "The Rule of Law and the Politics of Fear: Some Reflections on Northern Ireland" 
N.I.L.Q. (forthcoming). 
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perhaps, our loss of "power over", our socially constructed and conferred 
ability to dominate. 
(3) Equality 
If we revision human rights as being about "power to", and are hospitable to 
the ideals of solidarity and interdependence, we will also require a 
reconceptualization of equality. We can no longer accept "formal equality" or 
"equality of opportunity" as adequate to the task of a progressive praxis of 
human rights. Instead, human rights must aspire to "equality of condition". 
The focus of this approach is not solely on those who are disadvantaged, for it 
also factors in the structural conditions in which people exist so that they can 
have a real existential chance to pursue and direct their own destinies. As 
Margrit Eichler has pointed out, equality would transmute from an abstract 
concept to a concrete challenge to eliminate the hierarchical, socially 
constructed differences between people. a This would mean a reformulation of 
the human rights agenda towards what might ·be called "shrinking the 
disparity". 
3. TOWARDS A NEW HUMAN RIGHTS NORM: SELF-REFLEXIVITY 
Having identified and developed some of the underlying concepts of the 
Conference, I now want to address and reflect upon some of the emotions that 
I went through the last couple of days. Stated briefly, as I have sat through the 
sessions I have oscillated between optimism and pessimism, usually in inverse 
proportion to the tone of the presenters' thoughts. 
First, there were those who talked about the human rights conventions, 
institutions, decisions etc .. By and large theirs was a tone of reserved optimism, 
progress was being made, and problems were gradually being ironed out. My 
personal response to this type of presentation was much more pessimistic. To a 
person, it seemed to me that they all assumed the narrow and essentialist vision 
of what human rights might mean. Several went out of their way to emphasize 
that their work was beyond the contaminating crassness of politics. Their 
presentations indicate that, at least at this level, human rights has become mired 
in a legalized proceduralism, that it cannot even fathom the necessity for 
substantive transformation. 
However, there were- also many participants who talked about: the 
existential reality of domination and subordination; how perhaps things were 
getting worse rather than better; and how traditional and mainstream 
definitions of human rights were inappropriate for contemporary social 
relations. Examples might include: Charlotte Bunch, Ursula Franklin, Rozenna 
Maart, Mona Makram Ebeid and Catharine MacKinnon. Despite the genuinely 
• Margrit Eichler, "The Elusive Ideal- Defining Equality" (1988), 5 C.H.R.Y.B. pp. 167-188. 
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and generally pessimistic tone of their analyses, I felt their work to be 
energizing. Although still marginal to the malestream of human rights 
discourse, they have problematized and destabilized the traditional human 
rights bureaucracy; they are acutely conscious of the political nature of human rights; they have disconnected it from its seventeenth century roots; and they 
have attempted to reconstruct the practice and definition of human rights so as 
to suit the needs of the twenty first century. Through their efforts human rights 
are become prospective, not retrospective. 
These reflections on optimism and pessimism lead me to tentatively suggest 
a new norm for a modernist practice of human rights: the "Principle of Self­
Reflexivity", the "Principle of Self-Revisability". As human beings, we have 
an emotional self-interest in believing that we are doing the right thing. 
However, we need to be more conscious of the particularity and partial nature 
of our self-perception and consequently to proactively seek out the gaps and 
failures of our analysis. In other words, we need to build into our analyses a 
process of critical self-recognition, a disposition for humility and an openness 
to critique. 
The principle of "self-reflexivity" becomes particularly poignant and 
especially crucial if we are in a position of power and influence: whether it be 
at the micro or macro level. To provide a few suggestions of the utility of the 
principle in relation to situations of micropower that surfaced at this 
conference, consider some of the following illustrative examples. As a 
progressive white heterosexual male what are you doing in relation to issues of 
race, of gender, of sexual orientation? or, if you are a Black male struggling 
against racism, are there times when you perpetuate the domination of women? 
And if you are. a privileged white woman, are you excluding the perspective of 
the working classes or people of colour? 
On the level of macro power, the "self-reflexivity" principle also generates 
a series of problematics. Are the international human rights systems premised 
upon Euro-American ideologies that force the assimilation of other cultural 
worldviews? Or, are they driven by a male conception of the human condition 
and social structure·? Or again, as Kevin Hamilton asks, is our worldview 
essentially imperialist in that our "well intentioned" attempts to "civilize" what 
we arrogantly call "primitive" or "third world" societies fail to recognize the 
richness and sophisticatioo-of such cultures? Moreover, we must consider our 
legal systems' complicity - directly and indirectly, coercively and ideologically 
- in the entrenchment and perpetuation of abilism, classism, sexism, racism and 
homophobia:.. 
Of course, this process of "self-reflexivity" is not easy. It is painful to be told 
that you - individually and institutionally - are sexist and racist and abilist and 
homophobic. It is disturbing to be told that you are part of the problem when 
all along you thought you were part of the solution. You may want to resist. 
You may want to trivialize the critique. You may ridicule your detractors. You 
may want to lash out. However, the principle of "self-reflexivity" services as 
counterbalance to these knee-jerk reactions and demands that we respond to the 
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critiques with care, and responsibly. 
Moreover, the principle of "self-reflexivity" acts as a counterfoil to one of 
the most pervasive and nefarious strategies of domination, that is, the silencing 
or occlusion of oppressions. "Self-reflexivity" helps us to avoid creating new 
exclusions. For example, as Svend Robinson pointed out, homosexuality and 
lesbianism have been accorded a relatively low level of priority at this 
conference. The same is true of children's rights. There has been no discussion 
of the victims of global economic liberalization - also known as free trade - or 
the impoverishing activities of the World Bank and the western dominated 
International Monetary Fund. I am sure there are others, but self-�eflexivity 
demands that human rights discourse be open-ended, inclusive, pro-active, and 
forward-looking. 
The obvious answer to these criticisms is that it is not possible to deal with 
everything at once, that choices have to be made on the basis of a finite budget. 
Undoubtedly, this is true. However, the more interesting question is by what 
criteria will these choices be made and what ultimately will be the results of such 
choices? This type of question cuts, I think, to one of the fundamental 
dilemmas of progressive human rights practice: vision constrained by structure. 
Put simply, this conference could only have happened with the support of what 
are in essence elitist and conservative structures of power; they provided the 
credentials, they provided much of the funding, and they provide the space. Yet 
they also had to be heavily represented, taking up a lot of space, and frequently 
saying little that is of progressive value. The act of speaking is, of necessity, a 
monopolization of the channels of discourse and thereby excludes the voices of 
others. I think that given these constraints the organizers have done quite well 
in creating deviationist space for some of those who have been excluded by the 
mainstream of the human rights community. But we must be careful about the 
excesses of self-congratulation for a great deal more needs to be achieved. The 
obstacles are structural not just individual·. 
(I) Public/Private Dichotomy 
The principle of "self-reflexivity" has also helped me to get an angle on another 
of the tensions of the conference: the subterranean but pervasive influence of 
the public/private dichotomy. The public/private dichotomy like the 
essentialist conception of human rights invokes closure; it presupposes that 
there are certain spheres that are naturally "unchangeable", or are "beyond the 
mandate" . However, critical theory and feminism have exposed the "lie" of the 
public/private dichotomy and have demonstrated the constructed, contingent 
nature of that ideology, though all the time recognizing that it is a particularly 
pervasive one. 
I want to challenge the public/private dichotomy as it tends to manifest itself 
in human rights discourse, not to deny that there is State violence, but to 
highlight the incompleteness of an analysis that goes no further. There is 
absolutely no doubt that there is extensive State violence-, that it is pervasive and 
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systemic and that, in spite of all our self-perceptions of progress, perhaps that 
we have reached that stage where State violence has become normalized and 
therefore seemingly legitimate. 
Consider the following brief examples. In my native British occupied 
Northern Ireland, there have been "shoot to kill" policies carried out by 
RUC/SAS death squads; speeches made by members of the Thatcher 
government that, in my opinion, have led to the execution of lawyers who 
def end Irish freedom fighters [the parallel with the Rushdie a ff air seems to have 
been missed, the real difference being that Pat Finucane is dead and Rushdie is 
alive]; and the incarceration of political prisoners whose only "choice" is death 
by hunger strike. Then, of course, there is my current country of residence, 
Canada, the so called "peaceable kingdom" ,  with its phenomenally high 
incarceration rates of First Nations peoples and violations of human rights at 
Kanesatake and Kahnawake this past summer. And how could we forget the 
United States, with its covert and overt violence, domestically and 
internationally. Nor must we ignore the activities of the Israeli state against the 
Palestinian people, nor forget the historical repression by the Soviet Union 
against Jews in particular, and more generally the citizenry of other nations. 
These are important criticisms and should remain a component of human 
rights activism but, even in this sphere, particularly in societies that are so 
numbed by consumerism, the tendency is to only look at the spectacular 
disasters, the most extreme examples. The principle of self-reflexivity demands 
that we look at the normalization and legitimization of human rights abuse 
everyday via domestic law. I would argue that we have become desensitized to 
the horror of law, that law, and we· who work. in the legal system, have 
constitutionalized violence; and that we have imbricated within our laws what 
Hannah Arendt has called "the banality of evil" .9 
Though all of these fears of State violence, and a vast amount more, are true, 
to cease one's analysis of human rights abuses at this point would be to leave us 
with a dramatically incomplete picture. If human rights are to be understood as 
a challenge to power, as a mode of resistance to domination, then we must 
confront power in all its manifestations. 
Human rights have a contingent history. Specifically, they can be traced to 
the origins of the liberal democratic tradition. Central to this tradition was the 
ambition to control and limit the power of the Nation State. Even if it was true 
at the time, it is no longer. true that the State is the sole or even primary agent 
of domination in the late twentieth century world community. Only those who 
espouse what Asbjorn Eide has iconoclastically termed "fundamentalist 
liberalism" could believe this. Power over, power as domination, is not just 
centralized and statist. It is also pervasive, systemic, localized, individualized, 
privatized and technified. Rephrased, there are countervailing and 
complementary dominating powers to that of the State. Therefore, the 
public/private dichotomy, in this context, is best understood as an ideological 
• H. Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil ( 1976). 
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construct and social practice that simultaneously obscures and legitimizes 
private domination. Consequently, we need a reconceptualization and 
expansion of our conception of human rights if it is to be an effective strategy 
in the pursuit of equality of condition. 
Examples of the "private" abuses of human rights are legion and were 
pointed out in a number of papers. One example is the forum shopping by 
multinational pharmaceutical corporations either to dump or test drugs on 
humans. Another is the violence against women perpetrated in patriarchal 
societies. Specifically, pornography, as produced by an economic empire and 
consumed by individual men, subjects women to sexual assault, or as 
MacKinnon has powerfully portrayed, torture. Another example of private and 
novel forms of private human rights abuses are the practices around and uses of 
the New Reproductive Technologies. Private corporations in the pursuit of 
profit, and for no other reasons despite their humanitarian rhetoric, have 
joined what Renate Klein has described as an "unholy alliance of sexist, racist 
and eugenicist technodocs" which results in. commodification and 
objectification of women. Or again, the media, under the banner of the liberal 
fundamentalist principle of freedom of expression, propagate misogyny, 
racism, homophobia and xenophobia, frequently via the insidious strategy of 
blaming the victim. 
Cumulatively, this expanded conception of the domain of the human rights, 
engendered as it is by a rejection of the public/private dichotomy, is depressing 
because it highlights much more intangible and complex forms of abuses that 
simply cannot be fully fathomed within the fishbowl that is called malestream 
liberalism. Ursula Franklin nicely captured the problem through her discussion 
of what she called "control technologies", that they are a "headless tyranny", 
a paradigm of "power over" because they are routinized and normalized. 
Consider, in this light, Rhoda Howard's discussion of the self-mutilization of 
North American women, for example, by plastic surgery or by dieting to fit 
with the male image. 
But slowly, I.think, the first steps are being taken to combat the problem. By 
the process of naming� by fighting from the margins, the destabilization of the 
hegemonic view has begun_ Perhaps those who refuse to listen to these 
alternative conceptions of human rights, those who invoke the silencing 
strategy of definitional closure, those who control the international human 
rights agenda should get out of the way. Then they would be part of the 
solution, or at least not part of the problem. 
4. INDIVIDUAL AND COMMUNITY RIGHTS; UNIVERSALISM AND PARTICULARISM 
Another precept of fundamentalist liberalism and the essentialist conception of 
human rights is that the individual subject is the core, and frequently exclusive, 
focus of the analysis. However, the hegemony of this liberal weltanschauung 
reflects an impoverished vision of "the self", severing her interdependence with 
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"the other" and is blind to our mutually constitutive nature. Moreover, it may 
be premised on ethnocentric assumptions that fail to incorporate the needs 
and/or visions of subordinated cultures. This, in turn, has tended to generate 
a f etishization of rights ideology within international human rights circles 
thereby underplaying the importance of duties or other normative desiderata. 
What is required, I think is greater responsiveness to community needs and 
collective rights. Examples might include the inability of the Canadian 
Government to even comprehend, let alone recognize and affirm, the collective 
rights of the First Nations. Consider also the discomfort of many within the 
international human rights field with the African idea of duties not just rights. 
Perhaps we require, for example, the duty of the State to provide food, or the 
duty of private corporations to distribute wealth. 
The inability of mainstream human rights discourse to fully come to terms 
with the concept of collective rights is, in fact, symptomatic of another of the 
tensions that has pervaded the Conference: universalism and particularism. As 
I tried to make clear earlier, the traditional essentialist conception of human 
rights espouses universalistic assumptions and visions, premised upon generic, 
abstract, acontextual and transhistorical conceptions of the person, society and 
culture. I want to suggest, however, that this is a false universality because its 
very abstraction renders it pragmatically anaemic. More nefarious though, is 
that the pretension to universality obscures the partiality and uni­
dimensionalism of the underlying norms. To be clear, it seems to me that 
contemporary mainstream human rights discourse is premised upon a 
privileged, white male interpretation of the meaning of rights. 
What is required is much greater sensitivity to existential, specific reality of 
differently situated people. Rephrased, we need to work on conceiving and 
developing a contextualist practice of human rights, one that forgoes the 
mendaciously idyllic, one that comes to terms with the messiness, specificities 
and complexity of the multiplicity of realities. Let me provide a few examples. 
Environmental security may mean very different things depending on whether 
you live in a rich North Atlantic society, whether you are an Inuit, or whether 
you are an Indigenous person in a South American rain forest. Human rights 
activists should be sufficiently self-reflexive to recognize the diversity of these 
realities and to respond accordingly. This may require fundamental 
reinterpretations· of the source and nature of the problems, the types of 
questions asked and the answers sought. Or again, refugee rights, rather being 
premised upon some prototypical norm, must recognize the multiplicity of 
reasons for actually becoming a refugee including, for example, gender or 
sexual preference. This is very different from asking, does this person fit within 
the traditional legalized definition of "refuge status"? Similarly, if the right 
to be free from torture, inhuman and degrading treatment was reconstructed to 
accord with a contextualist approach then we would recognize the specific and 
particular harm that pornography causes to women even though there is no 
parallel for men. 
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5 .  RESPONSIBILITY AND SOLIDARITY: AN INTEGRATIVE THEORY OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS 
What I am trying to grapple with in this paper is the articulation of what might 
be called an Integrative Theory of Human Rights. In this approach, concepts of 
solidarity and interdependence are dovetailed with the dream of equality of 
condition to provide us with a discursive ideological practice that empowers us 
to go beyond liberal essentialism; assuage the seeming contradiction of the 
individual and community; and recognize the mutuality of 'self' and 'other'. 
Moreover, an integrative vision helps us to resist the subdivisioning (and 
therefore hierarchicalization) of human rights into civil, political, economic, 
social and cultural ghettoes because that, as Shelly Wright points out, 
fractionalizes and does violence to our existential reality. 
In particular
,. 
this Integrative Theory of Human Rights, because of its 
emphasis on solidarity, shifts the frame of analysis. Traditionally, the focus of 
human rights discourse has been on the victims of abuse. This is, of course, vital 
but at times it ironically results in a sort of structural 'blaming the victim' 
syndrome. Moreover, we must not forget that human rights abuses do not just 
happen. Somebody abuses somebody else; there is agency involved. This 
suggests that we must shift our focus. Therefore, we must look to the cause of 
the abuse, to seek out who or what is responsible. More specifically, it is 
necessary to self-reflexively inquire as to whether we who have privilege and 
power are complicitous in the subordination. 
Again some examples might help. Over the last couple of years one question 
that I have been asking myself is: What is my responsibility as a white male in 
relation to the domination of women? At this point, part of the answer is that 
I consider it one of my responsibilities to help make institutional space for 
women in the environment where I work and to facilitate the emergence of 
conditions of equality that would engender womens' empowerment. Note that 
this is very different from doing it for women, for that would be appropriate or 
masculinist ventriloquism. Rather, the project should be to surrender power 
over, to encourage power to. Alternatively, I would ask: What is the 
responsibility of the conference organizers in relation to, for example: the 
mentally or physically challenged; or the homosexual, lesbian or bisexual 
members of our societies; or Canada's linguistic minorities? 
A starting point and a central responsibility, I would suggest, is that we begin 
to learn to listen to others. One particular problem is that we of the western 
culture have constructed a hierarchy of communicative modes, that is, we 
priorize the written over the spoken word. By way of illustration, consider the 
preoccupation of the international human rights organizations with 
conventions, declarations, protocols, and judicial decisions compared to their 
almost total disregard of oral traditions of, for example, the African verbal 
tradition or First Nations. Perhaps modern technology could be put to some 
constructive use here, particularly the visual media. But listening is not enough. 
As Spike Lee has suggested we must "Do The Right Thing". 
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Although I have been critical of the international human rights bureaucracy, 
I also believe that it is too important, too powerful, too influential, to ignore. 
It too must be rendered vulnerable to the principle of self-reflexivity and the 
politics of progressivism. Therefore, it is perhaps time for us to name and 
espouse a new conception of rights: what might be called Solidarity Rights. 
Roberto Mangabeira Unger has tentatively identified these as being "the 
domain of the half-articulate relations of trusting interdependence", as giving 
"legal form to social relations of reliance and trust". 10 
It seems to me that several advantages might accrue from adopting the 
concept of Solidarity Rights. First, through the power of naming, we provide an 
entitlement concept that can be drawn upon by the victims of human rights 
abuse in the plethora of forms that have been identified in this conference. 
Second, when conceptualized and touted as a right then solidarity might just be 
understood (and perhaps even responded to) by those who are in positions of 
responsibility and power. Third, as a strategy, perhaps solidarity rights can be 
understood not as a complete break with the mainstream tradition of human 
rights discourse but as an emancipatory leap forward drawing on the already 
existing precedents of economic, social, cultural rights but casting them in a 
significantly new light. 
However, as my concerns about universalism make clear, insofar as the 
current international human rights community remains entrenched, other 
terrains of social struggle need to be developed. Therefore, the environmental 
slogan, "think globally, act locally", can perhaps be drawn upon in developing 
a critical practice of human rights activism. Viewed in this light, human rights 
must be fought for from the bottom up, as well as from the top down. By this 
I mean, rather than waiting for the sclerotic institutions to play catch up, those 
who are interested in the praxis of human rights must continue their efforts to 
reinforce the struggle against racism in South Africa and for self-determination 
by the First Nations of Canada; recognize the work of women in sexual assault 
centres as human rights work; and support the mobilization of Blacks in the 
United States, the' intifada by the Palestinians, and the development of anti­
sexist and anti-racist refugee policies. 
This might all sound just too much, too removed from the traditional ways 
of "doing human rights". However, the old essentialist ways will not serve the 
needs of the twenty first century. As the quote from Rich suggests, we need 
imagination but we do not need to re-invent the wheel for there are models of 
solidarity practices upon which we can build. Consider, for example: the 
feminist modes of alternative dispute resolution; the strategies of judicial 
education; the Waitangi tribunal; and the Rainbow Coalition of Jesse Jackson. 
However, I think that we need to look beyond the myopic confines of western 
society: to the non-violent action of the dispossessed in Latin America; to 
empowerment at the grass roots level in Asia; and the base communities and the 
•• False Necessity: Anti-Necessitarian Social Theory in the Service of Social Democracy ( 1987) 
pp. 535-536. 
Solidarity or Solipsistic Tunnel Vision? 1003 
preferential option for the poor and the oppressed as developed and practised 
by the traditionally conservative Catholic Church. 
6. CLOSING COMMENTS 
It seems to me that a theory and practice of human rights appropriate for the 
needs of the twenty first century requires a new critical modernist approach; 
one that challenges "power over" and pursues "power to"; one that highlights 
our responsibilities and our opportunities. The options are optimism or 
pessimism. As I have indicated there have been tensions and controversies in 
this conference. People have been angry, dismayed, hurt, frustrated. But part 
of the reason why this is so is because people who have traditionally been 
excluded have gained some space (though certainly inadequate) to articulate 
their vision of human rights. The debate has been painful and, I think that the 
human rights community have begun to hear them. The task that lies ahead is 
to invoke the standard of self-reflexivity; to turn critique into reconstruction; 
for those who have power to help transform rage into solidarity; and, for all of 
us to imagine and put into effect a new relationship, between life, law and love. 
